Over the las six years, Virginia outright won or shared the regular season ACC conference championship. Duke and North Carolina are the blue blood brands in the conference, but Virginia is the conference standard bearer. 

Unlike Duke and UNC, Virginia is not going through a transition.  Tony Bennett is one of the best coaches in the country.  Virginia is a stable program with a known identity and culture.  We can expect a controlled style of basketball with a methodical offense and a defense committed to the pack line philosophy.  Virginia is the embodiment of a person who is so confident and self-assured that they move to the beat of their own drum.  They are never rushed.  Never flustered. A steady force that knows how to do things and how to get to where they want to get.  

What Virginia believes is what has made them a success but when we dive into the data there has been a significant change and a deviation in recent years from the early to mid 2010’s.  The change is striking right at the heart of what Virginia believes.  

Virginia’s net rating has dropped over the last four years.  Virginias highest net rating was in 2018-2019 when Virginia won the national title but since 2019-2020, Virginia’s net rating has sunk below the 2012-2013 average.

Net rating is the difference between offensive and defensive efficiency ratings.  A decrease in net rating is caused by a decrease in offensive efficiency or an increase in defensive efficiency or both.  

Figure 2 explains the relationship between offensive and defensive rating.  The space between the two lines is the visual representation of the net rating.  A wider gap equals a high net rating.  An example of this is 2018-2019.  In 2018 the Virginia offense has a spike and the highest offensive rating in ten seasons, while the defensive rating hit a rating of 90.  These two forces pull the lines in opposite directions causing a gorge between the two.  That gorge is net the rating.

After Virginia’s championship year, the Virginia offense fell off a cliff but climbed back up a year later.  The concerning trend is an increase in defensive rating over the last three years.  The goal for defensive rating is to have a low rating which means that teams find it difficult to score on your defense. Tony Bennett and the Cavaliers believe in playing tough defense, but the defense has sputtered and played at its potential for three consecutive years. 

Traditionally an increase in defensive rating could be a signal of erosion in a program.  Despite the increase in defensive rating, Virginia has won the ACC conference championship which qualms concern but it’s worth exploring why there has been an increase in defensive efficiency over the last three years.  

Why has defensive rating increased? 

Before we dive into the data an obvious explanation for the increase in defensive rating is Covid.  The Covid shutdown took place in March of 2020.  While the end of the 2020 season was shut down, the 2020-2021 season was a challenge for teams throughout the country as they dealt with Covid outbreaks and shutdowns. The inability to consistently practice has a negative effect on a defense. It is a reasonable conclusion and explanation that Covid is the reason for the sharp increase in 2020 but what has caused the increase over the last two years? 

Opponent made field goals is used to calculate opponent possessions which is then used to calculate defensive rating.  

Opponent Possessions = 0.5 *  (Team FGA + 0.4 * Team FTA – 1.07 * (Team ORB/Team ORB + Opponent DRB) * (Team FGA – Team FG) + Team TO)

In the formula the defensive rating score is decreased by subtracting Team FG which stand for team made field goals.  An annual increase or decrease in opponent made field goals will impact the output for Opponent Possessions. 

Defensive Rating = (Points Allowed by Team/Opponent Possessions) * 100

When we examine the formula for defensive rating, we see the correlation that made field goals has on defensive rating.  Made field goals impacts the output for opponent possessions and it also determines the number of points scored by the opponent.  An increase in made field goals means more points allowed by a team and a higher defensive rating.  

According to Figure 3, Virginia has allowed the greatest number of field goals made over the last two years.  

Figure 4 highlights in blue the two years in which Virginia allowed the most made two-point field goals.  2012 and 2021 are the two years with the most made two-point field goals and a close third is 2022.  

Over the last two years, Virginia has allowed more opponent three-point shot makes than the previous eight years.  

Figures 4 and 5 provide clarity on why Virginia’s defensive rating has increased.  Teams are scoring more on the Virginia’s defense.  

The pack line defense is not a pressure defense. It is designed to gap and keep defenders from dribble penetrating.  A shift that has changed professional basketball is an increase in the frequency of three-point shots taken by players.  

Steph Curry has romanticized the three-point shot for younger generations and players emulating Curry are practicing and taking more three-point shots.  Analytics also have played a role in helping coaches design offenses that seek and allow a high frequency of three-point shots.  These trends are a challenge on all defenses and especially on defenses that prioritize protecting gaps and clogging up the lane over a high-pressure style that jumps the passing lanes and pressures the ball and the wings.  

Teams are making more shots against Virginia and teams are also shooting at a higher percentage.  2021 and 2022 mark the two years in which opponents shot field goals at the highest percentage.  

Opponent free throw attempts are down over the last 4 years from the previous 6 years.  There are several reasons to explain the decrease in opponent free throw attempts.  1. Virginia has figured out a way to play defense without fouling. 2. Virginia’s defense is less aggressive, the lack of aggression is leading to less free-throw attempts for opponents.  3. Opponent are not attacking the paint as much as before and becoming more dependent on the three-point shot. 4. a combination of all three. The problem, however, is the defense and the heart of the Cavalier’s identity.

Which is it?

According to figure 7, three-point attempts have been gradually trending up since 2012.  From 2012 to 2017 three-point attempts averaged below 20 attempts per game.  Since 2017, teams have averaged 20 or more three-point attempts four out of the five years.  

The change in opponent three-point attempts is not as drastic as it has occurred in the NBA where you have individual players taking more than 10 three-point shots a game.  Virginia’s methodical style may never allow for teams to shoot 30-40 three-point shots in the game because of the tempo that Virginia plays at and because the shot clock is longer than the NBA shot clock. The question is what is the threshold and signs given Virginia’s pace where the pack line may become a problem? 

The highest increase came in 2018-2019 when Virginia won the national championship.  The scoring margin favored Virginia by 17.57 points.  Virginia’s offense was so efficient, and the defense was tough that to get shots off, opponents had to shoot three-point shots.  

Giving up a three-point shot is not fundamentally against what Virginia wants to accomplish with the pack line defense.  A wide scoring margin means that teams are panicking and taking shots they don’t want to take because they are struggling to keep up with Virginia.  This was the case in 2018-2019.  Three-point attempts in 2018 were not due to the three-point phenomenon that has taken place in the NBA.   Teams shot the three-point shot in 2018 because they had no other options.  Offenses were snuffed out and desperation, panic and hopelessness touched opponent’s spine, minds and heart and they shot three-point shots as a signal of defeat.  

Taking more three-point shots becomes a problem if the scoring margin decreases and opponent three-point percentage goes up.

Opponents took the most three-point shots in 2018-2019 and they shot below 30%.  Three-point shooting in 2018-2019 falls within the framework and the desired outcome of the pack line defense.  

Starting in 2020 opponent three-point percentage averaged above 30% and in the 34 to 35% range.  This is a problem for Virginia because the expected value is above 1 point per shot.  

33% gives an expected value of 1 point per possession.  33% is the border of where opponent three-point shooting becomes a problem for defenses.  34% has an expected value of 1.02 points per possession and 35 has a value of 1.05.  

When teams start to shoot the three-point shot at a percentage where they can expect to average a point per three-point shot it means that the defense must account for every three-point shot taken.  If you have to get out to every shot then plugging the lane and sagging off guards is something that you can no longer afford to do.  

Three consecutive years of opponent shooting above 33% means that Virginia has a problem.  Thus far Virginia has been able to win games and be clutch during key times in the game but if the trend continues and teams start to shoot at 36% or higher, Virginia’s style of basketball becomes a weakness and a hindrance to their success.  

Virginia is still winning games despite the shrinking of the scoring margin.  Virginia went 28-5 last year and played at its highest game pace in a ten-year span.  

What is interesting about the 2022-2023 season is that Virginia increased is pace of play in 2022.  The highest pace that Virginia played at was in 2016 when it played at a pace of 60.77.  In 2022 Virginia increased its pace to 61.68.  To make such a jump in pace there must be a deliberate emphasis to push the ball.  Is the increase in pace a calculated measure taken by the coaching staff over concerns they have about their style of play or is it an outlier?  To try and answer the question we will look at how the rest of the conference is shooting the ball and what the conference trends are in relation to what is happening to the Virginia defense the last three years. 

The note at the bottom of the table explains the changes that have taken place from 2016 to 2022.  According to the data three-point attempts have increased by 3.3% in the ACC since 2016.  Three-point percentage has decreased by -0.72%.  Two-point attempts are down by -3.02% and two-point percentage is up by 4.3%.  

There is no indication in the data that we will start to see the conference average 25+ three-point attempts.  Three-point attempts fluctuate between 20.89 and 22.55.  There is not a steady and consistent increase of three-point attempts. The mode for three-point percentage since 2016 is 34%.  Two-point attempts have a more consistent decrease from year to year, but we do not see a correlation in which two-point attempts are spiraling down and three-point attempts are ballooning.  There does appear to be a slight increased dependence in three-point shots when compared to two-point shots.  The bottom line is that teams are not jacking up three-point shots and at the same time moving the three-point percentage up at the same time. 

The concern for Virginia is while three-point attempts and three-point percentage have an ebb and flow in the ACC, Virginia opponents have been increasing three-point attempts and three-point percentage against Virginia in the last three years.  The conclusion about the defense is that the defense is under performing. 

Virginia’s style is a proven commodity in conference games.  Conference games are where Tony Bennett demonstrates his coaching chops, and the format gives Bennett and the staff the ability to make modifications and adjust offensive and defensive strategies from the first round of conference games to the second round. The decrease in scoring margin means that games are getting tougher and more difficult to win but Virginia is still winning them and winning the conference.

Where Virginia has struggled is in the NCAA tournament.  Virginia is familiar with being knocked out of the tournament in the first round.  Winning the national championship, a year after Virginia suffered the embarrassment of being the sole one seed to be knocked off by a sixteen seed took the sting away, but that sting guts Virginia fans every season that Virginia is bounced from the tournament in the first round.  Virginia felt that jab again last year and it raises the question of the validity of the pack line defense and Virginia’s style of play in a single game elimination format like the NCAA Tournament.  

IS PLAYING AT A FASTER PACE A SOLUTION TO INCREASING SCORING MARGIN?

Figure 9 demonstrates that Virginia played at a faster pace in 2022-2023 than it did the previous nine years.  The scoring margin has shrunk since 2019 and for four years we have seen a decrease in the margin followed by an increase.  In 2019 and 2020 Virginia played at a pace below 60.  In 2020 and 2022, Virginias pace increased to 60 and 61.  

In May of 2023 the Athletic wrote an article about Virginia.  The article focused on retention and Virginia’s strategy to not get purged or to not have its players transfer out of the program.  The Athletic briefly discussed the following, “The Furman debacle resurrected the argument that Bennett’s famously plodding, defensive-oriented system is not ready-made for the postseason.  Bennett has won too many games in March – besides the championship, he has also gone to an Elite Eight and two Sweet 16’s, including one at Washington State – for that to warrant full merit. (Arizona played on of the fastest tempos in the country last season, and the Wildcats still got bounced by 15^th-seeded Princeton in the first round.)

The article makes a point that Tony Bennett has enough history and credit that the defense as a reason to not advance in the tournament should be dismissed.  The problem however is the comparison that the athletic makes when it brings up Arizona and the assumption that pace generated by offense is the same as pace generated by defense.  

Arizona’s tempo is driven by the offense.  The tempo is not caused by Arizona’s defense.  By using Arizona as an example of how fast-paced teams can be exposed to first round upsets the athletic takes the opposite identity of what Virginia is and uses it to support its conclusion.  The conclusion is correct in that teams that depend on fast-paced offenses can be bounced in the first round like teams that play a slow-paced defense, but the style of play and pace are completely opposite.  Defining pace in such a general term is a lack of basketball knowledge.  

Arizona is driven by offense which means that when the offense can’t play at a fast pace and get out and convert on easy baskets, it no longer is playing with its identity.  It is much easier for a slow-paced fundamentally sound defensive team to slow down a fast-paced offense.  If a grind it out team can slow down a face pace team, the style of the fight is determined by one team and that gives that team the advantage.  

 Virginia hangs its hat on defense.  Virginia can still play a fundamentally sound and tough defense but increase pressure and extend farther out to protect against the three-point shot.  Increased pressure and aggression if it’s controlled, will allows Virginia to increase its pace.  In this instance the pace is being set by the defense.  This type of pace is different than offensive pace with the difference being if the game is slowed down, the defensive team is still playing a style of basketball that it is comfortable of playing.  Virginia does not need to play at the tempo that Arizona does but increasing the pace from 59 to 61-63 will give Virginia more breathing room and increase the scoring margin, especially if the pace is being determined by the defense.    

The distribution for pace in 2022-2023 is not a normal distribution.  The distribution does not have outliers like 2014, 2016 and 2018.   The 2022 distribution is to the right of all the other distributions.  Because it’s pulled to the right farther than other distributions, the mean is higher.

Virginia’s average pace from 2012-2022 is 60.18.  When we compare 2019 and 2021 in figure 9, the mean pace for those two years is below the overall mean of 60.18.  

Last year, Virginia average pace was 61.68.  The pace is 1 ½ standard deviations away from the overall mean.  Because the pace is closer to two standard deviations than one, it means that the increase of pace is deliberate and something the Virginia coaching staff sees a solution to a problem.  The problem for me is the scoring margin and playing faster, especially in the first rounds of the NCAA tournament is the answer to not getting upset.  The problem for Virginia is that it still got eliminated in the first round.  

With an increase in opponent three-point percentage and more three-point shots being made by opponents against the pack line defense, Virginia becomes very vulnerable to defeat if the pace falls below 60.  

Playing at a higher pace is easier in the non-conference season and in the early months of the season. In Figure 13 we see more consecutive games in which Virginia played at a pace of 61 or above.  The pattern decreases in frequency in January, February, and March.  By March most of the games are at a pace below 60.  In the NBA and in the NCAA tournament, pace slows down.

Increasing the pace to 62 will not cause Virginia to play frantically or to change its identity to the Lakers show time.  Pressuring the ball, a bit more and playing the passing lanes farther out will allow Virginia to defend the three-point shot better and to increase their pace.  Ultimately, the pace will slow down in the NCAA tournament, but Virginia will play a more aggressive style that can be advantageous and force key turnovers at key moment to help push Virginia by the first round.  

The question is will Virginia play at a pace of 61 or above or go with what they are familiar with and play at a pace of 59-60?  We will find out the answer to this question this year. 

If Virginia plays at a faster pace, Virginia does not have to play a style that is foreign and uncomfortable to their identity.  What Virginia does need to address is why are opponents making more three-point shots at a higher percentage against Virginia the last three-years.  You cannot sag or play a pack line if teams are hitting three-point shots at a high clip.  The ACC three-point shooting trends are not important but what is important is how teams are shooting the ball against Virginia. 

What is clear is that Virginia is not causing teams to take desperation threes to keep pace with Virginia’s offense.  At a slower pace when Virginia got the lead and extended that lead to 8 to 10 points, the lead was the equivalent up being up 20 because teams could not score against Virginia and threw up shots out of desperation.  That sense of panic is not there anymore because averaging a point per three-point attempt extinguishes that dread.  

The pendulum appears to be at a point of balance but if the three-point shooting trends continue, Virginia will have to get out to shooters and such an evolution is an existential crisis for pack line purists.  The pendulum can swing against Virginia and Virginia will be put on tilt if they must get out to shooters and extend out of the pack line defense because they are being forced to do so instead of preparing and planning for it. If that happens, Tony Bennett will not be able to afford to double down on what he believes.  The problem for Virginia is the defense and that is their heart, soul and identity.